Greg Detre
Monday, 21 January, 2002
Dr Tasioulas
note C:\WINDOWS\Desktop\sussex philosophy\ethics\Ethics Lecture 8 � Moral Facts.htm
Introductory Reading: The Introduction to C. Gowans, Moral disagreements: classic and contemporary readings (Routledge, 2000).
Main reading: David Wiggins, 'Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990-1)
Tasioulas � his article in Inquiry
John McDowell � �Values and Secondary qualities� in Honderich (ed) �Morality and Objectivity� and McDowell, �Mind, value and reality�
Simon Blackburn � �Spreading the word�, ch 6 � CCC 401 Bl
David McNaughton
Gilbert Harman
David Wiggins
Thomas Nagel � �View from Nowhere�, ch 8
John Mackie � �Ethics�, ch 1
Michael Smith, �Moral realism� in LaFollette, Blackwell Guide to Ethical theory
Michael Smith, �Realism� in Singer (ed), Ethics
Hume on �Reason and Passion� in Singer (ed), Ethics
Routledge, �Objectivity�
Gilbert Harman, chs 1-3 in The Nature of Morality
Rorty
the disagreement thesis = that there are widespread and deep moral disagreements that appear persistently resistant to rational resolution
1. is this true?
2. if true:
a. would the disagreement thesis undermine the idea that morality is objective?
b. what attitudes/actions should we take towards people with whom we persistently disagree, and how can we cooperate?
3. if the disagreement thesis were true and undermines objectivity, would it entail a specific approach to how we should deal with those we disagree with?
the observer perspective = e.g. in the social sciences (like anthropology), �as participants in moral practices we make moral judgements, which we suppose have authority for people�
the participant perspective = how to live, evaluation of ourselves and others
perhaps also: that morality is objective
a person knows a moral proposition only if the person believes it, it is true and the person is justified in believing it
morality is objective only if:
moral propositions are ordinarily true or false � i.e. truth-apt
many moral propositions are true
persons have the capacity to be, and often are, justified in believing moral propositions
moral non-objectivists hold either/both that:
moral propositions are never true
no one is ever justified in believing moral propositions
because agreement is a key indicator of objectivity, the disagreement thesis, if true, would seriously damage the objectivist cause
human rights are thought to have universal authority � i.e. to provide a standard of moral conduct that applies to all persons and states in all places, irrespective of cultural differences
however, the prevalence of human rights as a de facto international moral standard only dates back recently to the birth of the UN
but there is question about whether they apply to non-Western countries, or those without a �cultural heritage of individualism�
e.g. the 1993 Bangkok Declaration of Asian states mainted that human rights must be considered in terms of �the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds�
anthropology is often considered to support the claims that:
the disagreement thesis is true to a significant extent
therefore morality is not objective but relative
and therefore we ought to tolerate the moral practices of other cultures
we need to consider anthropological data in the light of three questions:
how accurate are the data?
do the data show that the Yanamamo are really so different from �us� morally speaking?
do the data indicate �moral disagreements that appear persistently resistant to rational resolution�?
Gowans argues that evidence from anthropology paints a complex picture with regard to the disagreement thesis
19th century anthropologists viewed �primitive� cultural diversity with regard to an �objective� standard of European culture
Boas challenged anthropology to be more scientific and professional, emphasising the importance of understanding each culture in terms of its own distinctive values and circumstances, and through him + his students, anthropology came to be identified with relativism
there are at least five ideas associated with relativism in the anthropological literature:
1. that cultures different from one another in significant ways
2. that anthropologists as scientists should strive to be impartial and hence should not be judgemental about the cultures they study
3. that epistemic standards are valid only relative to a culture and hence lack objective validity (- quite controversial)
4. that moral standards are valid only relative to a culture and hence lack objective validity
5. that we ought to tolerate the moral values of other cultures
now, Linton maintains that �the resemblances in ethical concepts so far outweigh the differences� that there is a �sound basis for mutual understanding� between different cultures
Turner: �transcultural principle of justice� � individual and collective �right to their differences� so long as they respect the differences of others
Pyrrhonian skeptic � skeptical about everything, not just morality � complete suspension of belief (about the real nature of things), once you realise that for every belief there is as much to be said for it as against it
Aquinas � objectivist foundationalist structure
first principle: �that good is to be sought and done, evil to be avoided� is self-evident
on this are based all secondary principles and, ultimately, conclusions for individual actions
arguments occur when going from the general to the particular (there are often exceptions), and errors arise out of sin, passions, wrong persuasions, corrupt habits or customs etc.
Montaigne revived ancient skepticism, blended with a day-to-day Catholicism
Hume � generally regarded as a skeptic, because he says the foundation of morality is sentiment rather than reason
although he argues that human beings share �a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery�
basic moral principle for evaluating the character traits of a person: their usefulness or agreeableness to the person or others
thus, despite denying a rational foundation to morality, he believed that experience teaches us that human sentiment is such that there is a moral principle that is universal in the sense of both being accepted by and applied to all persons
like the objectivist accounts, you have to ask whether Hume really explained the disagreements we find in the world
Nietzsche: philosophers seeking to justify morality rationally were just �expressing the common faith in the prevalent morality�
need to compare many moralities, and determine the value/origin of each
discusses master/slave morality (in BGE) as the ways in which the strong and weak express their WTP
in evaluating values, Nietzsche is concerned not with truth but with their being �life-promoting�
need to distinguish disagreement arguments against moral objectivity from other arguments:
1. the practical/phenomenological aspects of our moral values (- they involve feelings and motivate us to act) are difficult to reconcile with objectivism
2. objective moral values have no cogent/essential place in a naturalistic picture of the world (peculiar metaphysical properties, play no crucial role in causal explanations of observations etc.)
3. reject objectivity in general (e.g. classical skeptical considerations such as the regress argument showing justification to be impossible, claims that no sense can be made of the idea that the mind represents reality, assertions that all beliefs depend on the contingencies of history and culture, contentions that purported objective beliefs are nothing but expressions of the WTP etc.)
different types of disagreements:
usually mid-level judgements of right and wrong (implications for particular cases, and usually involve fundamental considerations)
about the relative importance of general moral values, about the validity of moral theories, and about metaphysical or religious understandings of human nature and the world that figure in moral outlooks
disagreements can be implicit, e.g. apparent through different attitudes, actions, priorities etc.
dilemma = situation in which someone morally ought to (and can) do one thing, and morally ought to (and can) do another, but cannot do both � it�s a conflict within a single person
first premise of the disagreement argument is the disagreement thesis (that there are widespread and deep moral disagreements that appear persistently resistant to rational resolution)
in order for morality to be objective, we have to have the capacity for being justified in believing moral propositions
X is a key indicator of Y =
X is non-accidentally related to Y in an important (causal or logical) respect
the absence of X provides strong presumptive but defeasible evidence for the absence of Y
agreement between well-informed, reasonable persons is a key indicator of the extent to which we have this capacity for being justified in our moral beliefs
agreement indicator of objectivity = tendency of reasonable and well-informed persons to agree in their beliefs about propositions of a kind
areas where we feel most confident about objectivity are those where there is extensive agreement, e.g. sciences and maths, vs aesthetics or preferences for food
the agreement indicator of objectivity appears to be absent in the class of moral propositions, so �we have strong presumptive but defeasible evidence that it is false that we have the capacity to be, and often are, justified in believing moral propositions
you then need to show that the best overall explanation for the absence of the agreement indicator of objectivity for moral propositions is moral non-objectivism �/span> morality is not objective
the three challenges for a proponent of this disagreement argument are:
establishing the disagreement thesis
showing that this gives adequate grounds for thinking that the agreement indicator of objectivity is absent for moral propositions
established that no objective account of morality is a better explanation than all the non-objective ones (e.g. anti-realism, skepticism and relativism)
two attitudes towards the disagreement thesis:
some think that the falsehood of the disagreement thesis can be established a priori
discusses Foot�s response to Stevenson�s emotivist argument(???)
Davidson�s argument imposes a limit on the level of disagreement, given that translation is successful, there must be a broad measure of cross-cultural agreement
however, his argument may not be extensible to moral discourse
firstly, there might be significant agreement overall with radical disagreement in certain restricted areas
secondly, though there may be common moral beliefs between two societies, the common moral beliefs may vary from society to society
thirdly, this all depends on successful translation
on the other hand, others think that empirical investigation is crucial
xxx
can a moral realist accept some propositions as truth-apt and some not??? I suppose the answer is �yes�, as long as he�s able to tell the difference
what does it mean to say that one is �justified� in believing moral propositions???
what are the �epistemic standards� that may be valid only relative to a culture???
what�s the difference between Pyrrhonian skepticism and Rortian pragmatism, either in theoretical or practical (�lacking belief was supposed to ease the anxieties associated with trying to live in accordance with the truth�) terms???
Foot�s response to Stevenson about moral language (pg 18)
Moral realism:
the sentences we use when we make moral claims are capable of being either true or false � acts possess the features of rightness/wrongness
some such sentences really are true
Nihilism or Error theory:
yes, there are sentences expressing
claims about the way the world which have truth value, but they are all false
Expressivism or non-cognitivism:
sentences making moral claims are not used with the intention of saying something that is capable of being either true or false � we do not use to them in an attempt to make claims about the way the world is
rather, we use moral sentences to express our feelings about acts, people, states of the world etc. � �Boo for torturing babies!�
the two fundamental questions/criteria about moral realism are:
whether sentences that ascribe rightness and wrongness to actions are capable of being true or false
if yes, we refute expressivism
if so, whether any such sentences ascribing rightness/wrongness to actions really are true
if yes, we refute nihilism
and then we�re committed to moral realism
he then labours a �true strictly-speaking� distinction (saying that p vs saying that �p is true�), since the surface grammar that anyone with any moral commitments uses appears to entail the sort of moral realist semantic assent (ascent???) required by those two criteria
�the role of the words �true� and �false� is simply to enable us to register our agreement and disagreement with what people say without going to the trouble of using all the words that they used to say it�
i.e. saying that p is the same as saying that �p is true� strictly-speaking
thus if you accept the minimalist�s story about truth, and have any moral commitments at all, then you are a (Minimal) Moral Realist
however, the minimalist�s story is very inadequate
it fails to tell us what it is about a sentence that is capable of truth and falsehood that makes it capable of truth and falsehood, i.e. the conditions that need to be satisfied by s in order for �s is true� to be a meaningful sentence in English, i.e. �what feature of the truth-apt sentences of English makes them truth-apt?�
minimalists argue that purely syntactic features distinguish truth-apt sentences, e.g. they fit in �John believes that ___��type frames
Smith uses the example of Caroll�s nonsense poem �Jabberwocky� to show that syntactically-correct and well-formed seeming sentences like ��I believe that the slithy toves are gyring and gimbling in the wabe� is true� have no meaning, and so are incapable of being either true or false
consequently, syntax alone is not enough to establish truth-aptitude, i.e. moral sentences are not truth-apt just by virtue of being declarative sentences
what would have to happen to �the slithy toves are gyring and gimbling in the wabe� to make it meaningful?
well, �the constituent words in the sentence would have to be associated with patterns of usage which make it plain what information about the world people who use the words in those ways intend to convey when they use them�
�in order to be truth-apt, sentences must be capable of conveying information or giving the content of people�s beliefs, � or be suitably related by some grammatical transformation to sentences that could, in principle, be used to give the contents of people�s beliefs�
for moral sentences to be truth apt, words like �right� and �wrong� would have to be �associated with patterns of usage that make it plain what information about the world people�s use of them is intended to convey�
can we give an account of the information about the world that the use of such words is intended to convey?
the internalism constraint - people�s moral views tell us something about their dispositions to action
there is an internal or necessary conection between the moral judgements we make and our motivations
thus, there is a constraint on the proper use of moral sentences (e.g. �torturing babies is wrong�) that someone who sincerely utters it is averse to tortuing babies (absent depression, weakness of will etc.)
expressivists ask what it is about moral sentences, as opposed to other beliefs (e.g. �snow is white�), that gives them this motivating force
they argue that moral sentences cannot be used to give the contents of anyone�s beliefs because there are no such beliefs for anyone to express, since beliefs are states that give information about the world
rather, moral sentences express desire/aversion to an action, rather than a belief-state about that action�s rightness/wrongness
how else could the use of moral sentences be constrained by the truth of internalism if their proper use is to convey information?
naturalism = the view that the world is (entirely) amenable to study through empirical science
Smith reckons that naturalism is very plausible because of the success of empirical science in explaining various aspects of the world
any account of whatever feature of torturing babies it is that makes it wrong is constrained by our conception of the world in which we live, which is a naturalistic conception
so any form of moral realism must be naturalistic, i.e. all features that we have reason to believe objects have must be posits, or composities of posits, of empirical science
thus moral sentences� truth-aptitude supervenes on naturalistic features of the world � �two acts which are identical in all of their natural features must be alike in their moral features as well�
we still need to answer which natural features warrant the ascription of various moral features to acts
Moore�s open question argument says that just because acts of a given moral feature always have a certain natural feature does not mean that the moral and natural feature are the same
suppose that �rightness� and �utility maximisation� were one and the same feature of acts
then �rightness� and �utility maximisation� are analytically/a priori equivalent
�this act maximises utility, but does it maximise utility?� is a closed question
�this act maximises utility, but is it right?� is an open question (i.e. open to reasoned argument)
thus �rightness� and �utility maximisation� are not analytic equivalents, i.e. they do not pick out the same feature
no matter which natural features we choose, it seems that it is never obvious whether an act with such features is �right�
if sound, this has the very strong conclusion that rightness is not identical with any natural feature of acts at all
Moore advocated a realm of extra, sui generis, non-natural ontological properties
the truth-aptitude of moral sentences rests on non-naturalistic features/states of the world
but how do we come by knowledge of these �extra, spooky, non-natural properties� � not by observation, or extension from any naturalistic knowledge � perhaps by some non-empirical intuitive moral sense?
and why do these non-natural moral properties supervene on (particular/contingent???) natural properties � might they float free in an alternative world?
if you discard non-naturalistic moral realism, then the open question argument appears to say that such non-natural moral features are nowhere instantiated in actuality, hence all our moral beliefs are false = nihilism
alternatively, the open question argument could be seen as a reductio of the very idea that there are moral features = argument for expressivism
however, expressivism may itself also be vulnerable to the open question argument
since it says that �Michael judges that torturing babies is wrong� is analytically equivalent to the naturalistic claim that �Michael expresses his aversion to torturing babies�
however, �Michael expression expresses his aversion to torturing babies, but does he judge that torturing babies is wrong?� is not a closed question, and so �expressing his aversion to �� and �wrong� are not one and the same (analytically equivalent)
if sound, the open question refutes expressivism by showing that Michael�s judging it wrong to torture babies isn�t analytically equivalent to any natural feature of Michael either
the open question argument has now ruled out the three options which we said covered all the possibilities � so the open question argument itself must be unsound
the problem with the open question argument may lie in the claim that �rightness� and �the property of maximising utility� (for example) are not analytically/a priori equivalent, i.e. that they pick out different features
e.g. water is not analytically/a priori equivalent to H2O, but we know a posteriori that water is H2O
thus it might be an a posteriori truth (discoverable through observation + inference) that �rightness� and �the property of maximising utility� are identical
so then naturalistic moral realists have to show how/why the natural and moral feature are a posteriori equivalent
arguably, we label a given empirical phenomena right/wrong, and then look for a moral feature which fills this role, e.g. disvoer that the feature that is causally responsible for acts that we consider to be �right� is the maximisation of utility, then we conclude that rightness is the property of maximising utility
supposedly, this is like fixing the reference of �redness� to the description �the property of objects, whatever it is, that causes them to look red to normal pereivers under standard conditions�
the difference is, and the reason that this a posteriori explanation is inadequate, is that we can�t fix the reference for rightness in the same a priori way that we can for redness
I think Smith is saying that to say that we know in advance which empirical phenomena are right and which are wrong in advance (i.e. before figuring out what the common feature is which we label the moral feature, e.g. maximising utility) is begging the question
we should reconsider what we mean by analyticity. it should not be judged by the obviousness of the analysis, or whether it�s open to reasoned argument
in the case of �redness�, the analytic equivalent that we seek is something that captures a complex set of constraints, i.e. the properties that cause us to have those certain visual experiences, most reliably detected in the daylight, subject to defect in one�s eyes etc. = �the property of objects that causes them to look red to normal perceivers under standard conditions�
thus, analyticity allows for reasoned argument in determining the complex set of constraints on the use of the word being analysed and whether or not this complex set is entailed by the proposed analysis
if we accept this account of conceptual analysis, then Moore�s law is too stringent and fails to refute the equivalence between �rightness� and a given natural feature, and the naturalistic project is back on track
externalist realism = �the view that though we can, by reflecting on the ways in which we use moral words, find a naturalistic equivalent for the term �rightness�, the naturalistic equivalent we come up with will leave it completely open whether someone who believes an act to be right will desire/be indifferent/averse to performing that act�
I think this means that we can find a way of reducing/translating moral features into natural features (and vice versa), but this adds no motivation for acting on the moral beliefs that this leads us to hold (or that we hold already)
externalist realists must:
show why the particular natural/moral feature equivalence they propose is correct, i.e. that the way in which we use moral words corresponds to that moral/natural translation/reduction system, i.e. �rightness� (like the term �electron�) �serves to pick out a feature in virtue of the characteristic causal role that that feature occupies�
they also have to explain why we think we have the internalist constraint, i.e. why possession of a moral belief brings a desire to perform that act (absent depression, weakness of will etc.), since this isn�t really explained/accounted for by the externalist theory at all � it divorces (and makes mysterious) the connection between explanatory role (what acts are �right�) and justificatory potential (why we should do what is �right�)
internalist realism = (like external realism) �we can characterise rightness in terms of its distinctive explanatory role, but the explanatory role characteristic of rightness is, broadly speaking, that of eliciting desire under certain idealised conditions of reflection�
i.e. the natural feature common to all �right� acts is whatever we would desire to do given idealised conditions of reflection
e.g. �rightness� = that feature, whatever it is, that we would desire our acts to possess if our desires formed a set that is maximally informed, coherent and unified � the internal realist claims that this analysis of rightness reflects the way in which we use moral words
the justificatory potential of this characterisation of rightness derives from the fact that any belief about the �right� action is what we would desire ourselves to do in those circumstances if our desires were immune to rational criticism
he thinks this fits well with our use of �right� as being settlable a priori
he also thinks that the justificatory potential/motivation to do the �right� thing derives from a rational pressure to do what you would do if your desires were maximally informed/coherent/unified etc. (which = �right� according to internal realism)
they argue that the fact that depression, weakness of will affect our choosing to do the �right� thing for exactly this reason, i.e. that it is because we are at the opposite end of a coherent, informed + unified set of desires when depressed/weak-willed that we don't do the right thing (i.e. because of psychological incoherence)
does the �we� in internalist realism refer to all rational creatures? i.e. should we all converge in the desires that we would have under idealised conditions of reflection, or will culturally-induced discrepancies make for contingently different rational choices? if so, then the theory is relativistic
relativistic internalist realism = a subset of rational creatures (those who have desires like our own) are such that they would desire that we act in that way under idealised conditions of reflection
but other perfectly rational creatures may differ from us
non-relativistic internalist realism = their having corresponding desires as part of their idealised desire set is required for the theory to be true
Smith doesn't like the relativistic account, since he doesn't think that rationally optional culturally induced desires could affect rightness
the non-relativistic account holds that the grounding of rightness is non-arbitrary, and consequently universal, as a result of our shared status as rational beings
however, it depends on us having a set of desires that is maximally informed, coherent and unified � �thus we won't be convinced about even this version of moral realism unless we are confident that the arguments we give ourselves for desiring as we do are arguments that should convince the arbitrary rational person to desire likewise�
see: C:\greg\academic\reading\phil\topics\ethics\
ethical objectivism\MackieandMorals2.htm
there are no objective values (moral scepticism/subjectivism � 2nd order), whether moral, aesthetic or whatever. this is different from:
first order moral scepticism � �all this talk of morality is tripe�, rejects all moral judgements
first order moral subjectivism � �everyone really ought to do whatever he thinks he should�
or the doctrine that �this action is right� means �I approve of this action� (emotivism)
Mackie�s moral subjectivism is a negative doctrine, rather than a positive one like this
his is an ontological rather than linguistic or conceptual thesis
indeed, emotivists presuppose a lack of objectivity in values, although conversely of course a lack of objectivity does not entail that all moral statements are just subjective reports
there are then several types of second order moral question � usually re: meaning + use of ethical terms or the analysis of ethical concepts or the logic of moral statements + arguments
Hare says he does not know what it means to talk of the �objectivity of values�
he asks what the difference is between a world with only subjective values, and one where values are built into its fabric objectively, remembering that there is no difference in the subjective concern people have for things�
Mackie argues that the objectivity of values would certainly not affect people�s subjective concerns, but that this point only reiterates the distinction between 1st and 2nd order ethics: 1st order judgements are not necessarily affected by the truth or falsity of a 2nd order view
he says that the world with objective values is different, because there is something that backs up and validates people�s subjective concerns
Hare�s example excludes the possibility that in the objective world, the people might tap into the objectivity of their world in deciding upon their subjective concerns
there is more to objectivity of value than universal agreement (i.e. mere intersubjectivity), or universalisability (that everyone could/should follow the same prescription)
he contrasts objectivism and descriptivism
descriptivism: the meanings of ethical terms and statements are purely descriptive, not even partly prescriptive or evaluative
this is in contrast with the Platonic forms, for instance, where the values in the Form of the Good are real, and the sight of them is enough to ensure adherence to them without further motivation
for many such philosophers, values are objectively prescriptive
perhaps Hare�s difficulty with the �objectivity of values� is a difficulty in imagining how values can be part of the fabric of the world
such an objectivity of goodness would allow us to refute 1st order egoism � however, the objectivity of rationality would not help (�/span> universal egoism)
alternate restatement of objectivity of values is to say that values cannot be true or false
but, even in a world without objectivity of values, there are values with clearly defined criteria which can be true or false (e.g. marking of exams, skating + diving championships), in relation to agreed and assumed standards
however, the standards by which even such structured value-judgements operate are themselves only partly determinate and subjective to some extent
either way, these do not constitute �in our sense� an objective value
Kant�s imperatives = �ought� statements in the imperative mood
categorical: �you ought to do Y� if the oughtness is irrespective of any desire to which Y would contribute
hypothetical: �if you want X, (you ought to) do Y�
the reason for doing Y is based on a causal connection between Y and X (the desired end) � the oughtness is contingent on the desire
however, conditional clauses need not necessarily be hypoethical, e.g. if you promised then you ought to do Y�, and imperatives (grammatically) need not be categorical (e.g. parade ground orders)
a categorical imperative = not contingent on any present desire of the agent�s
Mackie�s thesis (that there are no objective values) = no such categorically imperative eement is objectively valid
swings of opinion between non-cognitivist and naturalist views
neither seem adequate on their own
non-cognitivist ignores the claim to objective validity
naturalism ignores the categorical imperative aspect
accepting a lack of objectivity of values can seem to undermine subjective concerns, but Mackie seems to think that this needn�t be the case
Russell doesn�t think it logically inconsistent to believe ultimate ethical valuations to be subjective while expressing emphatic ethical beliefs
the basic, conventional meaning of moral terms incorporates an objective, intrinsic prescriptivity
however, this linguistic + conceptual objectivity is not enough, is not self-validating
thus moral scepticism is an error theory, explaining this falseness in our usage of moral terms
two arguments in support of moral scepticism � from relativism + queerness
wide variation in moral codes between (+ within) communities
such diversity of first order beliefs undermines the notion of objectivity in 2nd order ethics
however, we must remember that disagreement (1st order) exists even in objective fields like science, though mainly because of a lack of evidence
in contrast, differences in moral systems arise out of adherence to and participation in different ways of life, not out of perceptions of objective values
it seems possible though that these variations from group to group could be epxlained as arising out of a few general principles (e.g. utilitarianism) adapted to different concrete circumstances
however, as Hare says, it seems more likely that these ideals/�fanaticism� arise out of moral sense/intuition than reason
metaphysical + epistemological
any objectivist about values is committed to the thesis of intuitionism, since they would be entities or qualities of a very strange sort inaccessible to us by any other means
Price argues that it is not just mroal knowledge that is threatened by a Lockean/Humean empiricism, but also essence, number, identity, solidity, infinite time + space, causation etc.
Mackie thinks that satisfactory accounts can be given of all these things in empirical terms
he doesn�t accept that ethical statements are unverifiable, or that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning
the notion of objective values is not meaningless, but false
Plato�s Forms show what objective values would have to be like
they provide direction + overriding motive
but where/what could this necessary connection be between natural features/facts of an object and its moral status
there doesn�t seem to be any possible logical or semantic necessity
continual coincidence is not enough
it needs to be supervenient or consequential
can we replace the moral quality with a subjective response causally linked to the natural features on which the quality is consequential?
so why is the common sense belief in the obecitivty of ethics so difficult to shake?
�pathetic fallacy� � the tendency to read our feelings into their objects
socially established (+ necessary) patterns of behaviour become internalised
in contrast, aesthetic values (which have the same status) are less objective-seeming because compelling
something may be objectively desirable, but it is we who see objective value in it (as a result of its desirability)
ethics as a system of law minus legislator (e.g. the Christian-derived Western moral concepts)
Greek morality emphasises �good� rather than �ought�, the satisfying rather than the divinely commanding
an Aristotelian approach to morality focuses more on the good for man/general goal of human life/basic goods/primary purposes
moral reasoning = understanding + pursuing/realising this goal
however, this general goal can be understood 2 ways
a)�� describing what it is that we (would) find most satisfying
b)�� what it is that we should be striving after (normative/evaluative)
often these two separate interpretations are ocnfused
with regard to a), he warns there may not be a single �good� for man
as for b), it can either be subjectively prescriptive or it is open to the same criticisms as before about objective categorically imperative values
they may be combined to make another �pattern of objectification�: b)�s normative with a)�s objective elements
arguments from both relativity and queerness apply
sometimes the objectivist may have recourse to the purpose of God � and that would be fine if such a theological doctrine could be defended�
can moral principles be tested and confirmed in the way that scientific principles can?
scientific hypotheses can usually be tested in real experiments in the real world (although observations are always �theory-laden� to at least some extent, because forming a belief from a perception requires/involves understanding the relevant concepts by virtue of their role in some theory or system of beliefs)
the difference between the role of observation in science and in ethics is that �you need to make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the occurrence of the observations that support a scientific theory, but you do not seem to need to make assumptions about any moral facts to explain the occurrence of the so-called moral observations I have been talking about. In the moral case, it would seem that you need only make assumptions about the psychology or moral sensibility of the person making the moral observation. In the scientific case, theory is tested against the world.�
�The observation of an event can provide observational evidence for or against a scientific theory in the sense that the truth of that observation can be relevant to a reasonable explanation of why that observation was made. A moral observation does not seem, int eh same sense, to be observational evidence for or against any moral theory, since the truth or falsity of the moral observation seems to be completely irrelevant to any reasonable explanation of why that observation was made. The fact that an observation of an event was made at the time it was made is evidence not only about the observer but also about the physical facts. The fact that you made a particular moral observation when you did does not seem to be evidence about moral facts, only evidence about you and your moral sensibility.�
�Certain moral principles might help to explain why it was wrong of the children to set the cat on fire, but moral principles seem to be of no help in explaining your thinking that that is wrong�
extreme nihilism = morality is simply an illusion: nothing is ever right or wrong, just or unjust, good or bad, perhaps even merely a superstitious remnant of religion
moderate nihilism = the purpose of moral judgements is not to describe the world but to express our moral feelings or to serve as imperatives we address to ourselves and others
naturalism = the sensible thesis that all facts are facts of nature
ethical naturalism = the doctrine that moral facts are facts of nature
there are moral facts and they can be �reduced� to natural facts of a sort that might explain observations (in the way that facts about colour might be reduced to facts about physical characteristics of objects, the properties of light and the perceptual apparatus of an observer)
perhaps by analysis of moral facts as facts about functions, roles and interests
or by constructing an �ideal observer theory� like with colour
definitional naturalism = moral judgements are definitionally equivalent to natural judgements
the �open question argument�
any naturalistic reduction in ethics has the form �P ought to do D if and only if P�s doing D has characeristics C� in which the characteristics C are naturalistic characteristics of a sort that can help explain observations
but then
�I agree that for P to do D would be for P to do something that is C, but ought P to do D?�
is an open question in the way that
�I agree that P ought to do D, but ought P to do D?�
is not
and since the first question is an open question while the second is not, the natural characteristic of being an act that is C cannot be equated with the moral characteristics of being an act that ought to be done
to defend against the �open question argument�, you can try and show that the first question is not necessarily open, e.g.
�I agree that, if P does D, P will satisfy the relevant interests, but ought P to do D?�
more importantly, the �open question argument� is invalid, e.g. it is not an open question whether water is water, but it is an open question whether water is H2O � even though water is H2O
so, even though moral judgements do not seem to help explain observations, there could still be moral facts if these facts were reducible in some way or other to other facts of a sort that might help explain observations (like colour facts), i.e. a naturalistic reduction of moral facts
reducing moral facts to facts about interests, roles and functions would be complex, vague and difficult to specify
the problem with reducing moral facts is that it is difficult, and does not seem ever to be useful in practice in our explanations of observations
Truth is "what it is better for us to believe� (James) rather than �the accurate representation of reality�. Or, the notion of �accurate representation� is really only a preference for �those beliefs which are successful in helping us do what we want to do�. This is part of his pragmatist conception of knowledge which �eliminates the Greek contrast between contemplation and action, between representing the world and coping with it�.
�The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations � some accurate, some not � and capable of being studied by pure, non-empirical methods�, with Descartes and Kant seeking knowledge (more accurate representations) by inspecting and polishing the mirror (through �conceptual analysis�, �phenomenological analysis�, �explication of meanings�, examination of �the logic of our language� or of �the structure of the constituting activity of consciousness�). Wittgenstein�s �post-positivistic� stance in the Philosophical Investigation mocked these attempts. In Dewey�s ideal society, �culture is no longer dominated by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement�.
��Truth� is the will to be master of the multiplicity of sensations� (Nietzsche). �The �true� is simply the expedient in the way of believing� (James). Kuhn thought that �science should not be thought of as moving towards an accurate representation of the way the world is in itself�. �Truth is correspondence to the intrinsic nature of reality� (Plato). Pragmatists never call themselves relativists.
The �correspondence theory of truth� � obvious and self-evident? or barely intelligible, of no particular importance, and �just one philosophical view among others�?
�Objective� � i.e. found or discovered, �in some sense out there waiting to be recognised by us human beings�? or �really made or invented�?
But Rorty can�t accept the making/finding distinction, otherwise �Have we discovered the surprising fact that what was thought to be objective is subjective, or have we invented it?� �If truths are merely convenient fictions, what about the truth of the claim that that is what they are?�
Rorty wants to stop using the finding/making, objective/subjective, nature/convention, real/apparent and absolute/relative vocabulary and distinctions. But some opponents suggest �that to be rational consists precisely in respecting these distinctions�.
A belief is a �habit of action� (Peirce). It is merely to say that there is no point in asking whether a belief represents � either mental or physical reality�. Rather, we should ask, �For what purposes would it be useful to hold that belief?�
The argument should �not be about which of us has got the universe right�. �We cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry�. �The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring about consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends.� �All areas of culture are parts of the same endeavour to make life better. There is no deep split between theory and practice�.
�To treat beliefs not as representations but as habits of action, and words not as representations but as tools, is to make it pointless to ask, �Am I discovering or inventing, making or finding?��
(I)� ... elements of what we call 'languge' or 'mind' penetrate so deeply into what we call 'reality' that the very project of representing ourselves as being 'mappers' of something 'language-independent' is fatally compromised from the start. Like Relativism, but in a different way, Realism is an impossible attempt to view the world from nowhere (RHF 28)
(II) [We should] accept the position we are fated to occupy in any case, the position of beings who cannot have a view of the world that does not reflect our interests and values, but who are, for all that, committed to regarding some views of the world - and, for that matter, some interest and values - as better than others (RHF 178).
(III)����� What Quine called 'the indeterminacy of translation' should rather be viewed as the 'interest relativity of translation'... 'Interest relativity' contrasts with absoluteness, not with objectivity. It can be objective that an interpretation or an explanation is the correct one, given the interests which are relevant in the context (RHF 210).
(V) To say, as [Bernard] Williams sometimes does, that convergence to one big picture is required by the very concept of knowledge is sheer dogmatism ... It is, indeed the case that ethical knowledge cannot claim absoluteness; but that is because the notion of absoluteness is incoherent (RHF 171)
Rorty argues that Putnam is plain wrong about this, and that in fact he has "urged that we continue to speak with the vulgar while offering a different philosophical gloss on this speech than that offered by the realist tradition" and "complained over and over again about Heidegger's and Derrida's overestimation of the cultural importance of philosophy". (Rorty)
"For pragmatists like Putnam and me, the question should always be 'What use is it?' rather than 'Is it real?' or 'Is it confused?'.
"our norms and standards of warranted assertibility ... evolve in time" (Putnam).
Rorty thinks that "matter of fact" must mean more than just "our ability to figure out whether S was in a good position, given the interests and values of herself and her peers, to assert p", that it must mean "whatever makes it possible for a statement not to be warranted even though a [vast] majority of one's peers say it is". This must require "some natural order of reasons which determines, quite apart from S's ability to justify p to those around here, whether she is *really* justified in holding p".
"truth as idealised rational acceptability". What can this mean except "acceptability to an ideal community", which can only mean "*us* ["educated, sophisticated, tolerant, wet liberals"] as we should like to be". This is what he means by saying "that pragmatists should be ethnocentrists rather than relativists". What alternative does Putnam have, given that he doesn't want to follow Williams and Peirce in saying that "the notion of knowledge entails that of convergence to a single result". Similarly, we're not allowed to use 'idealized' to refer to "a process built into any and every inquiry ... which will guide us ... along convergent lines". Without that, "the terms 'warranted', 'rational acceptability' etc. will always invite the question, 'to whom?'". Surely just "us at our best"?
He is arguing that we should choose our standards of warranted assertability on the basis of how good they will come to seem to us-at-our-best (the idealised wet liberals we would like to be), rather than in Putnam's terms of 'idealised rational acceptability'. This will not satisfy necessary or sufficient conditions for a view/theory/practice being better, "for the usual 'naturalistic fallacy' reasons". We should set aside 'better' and �true', and just ask "which explications raise more problems than they solve".
This anti-Rorty argument is attributed to Putnam by Williams: "[Rorty's views] simply tear themselves apart. If as Rorty is fond of putting it, the correct description of the world (for us) is a matter of what we find it convenient to say, and if, as Rorty admits, we find it convenient to say that science discovers a world that is already there, there is simply no perspective from which Rorty can say, as he also does, that science does not really discover a world that is already there, but (more or less) invents it."
Rorty responds in various ways, arguing that Williams has conflated two claims, one of which is a "straw-man claim" that "there were no dinosaurs or atoms before we 'invented' them" which is "not entailed by anying in I-V above". Moreover, there will be things that are even more convenient to say in the future that supercede the ideas that Williams lists as being currently convenient. The metaphilosophical question about pragmatism doesn't centre on what the most convenient beliefs it is currently holding are, but "whether there is something other than convenience to use as a criterion in science and philosophy", where "'convenience' in this context means something like: ability to avoid fruitless, irresolvable, disagreements on dead-end issues".
Rorty's strategy to "[escape] the self-referential difficulties into which 'the Relativist' keeps getting himself is to move everything over from epistemology and metaphysics to cultural politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to suggestions about what we should try", but Putnam does not adopt it. "At the last moment, it seems to me, he turns intuitionist", even though he concedes that we might "behave better if we became Rortians - we may be more tolerant, less prone to fall for various varieties of religious intolerance and political totalitarianism", which is exactly what Rorty wants. Putnam wants to know why, if these are Rorty's goals, why he doesn't argue directly for them - Rorty responds that this is just the sort of approach that someone who "thought of philosophy as the pedestal on which culture rests" would take...
Putnam accuses Rorty of secretly saying that "from a God's-Eye View there is no God's-Eye View". Rorty doesn't understand what the difference is between what he says about 'better' and Putnam's I-V, that they are both just "criticising accepted cultural norms and standards" by suggesting alternatives.
Rorty reckons that Putnam's main problem lies with Rorty's Darwininism, e.g. a naturalistic account of reason. They both dismiss the idea that we have evolved to track truth and "represent it accurately", "as opposed to merely coping with it cleverly". Then Putnam dismisses Foucault and Rorty as 'cultural relativists', "who want to reduce 'better' to consensus, and thus are unable to offer rational criticism of a prevailing consensus" ("reductionism and historicism"). Putnam concludes that "as thinkers we are committed to there being *some* kind of truth, some kind of correctness which is substantial and not merely 'disquotational'. That means that there is no eliminating the normative".
Rorty thinks that Putnam runs together the question 'Can we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of normative expressions?' with 'Does our familiar use of normative expressions show that there is "some kind of correctness which is substantial" (or that "the rightness or wrongness of what we say is not *just* for a time and a place")'? Rorty thinks 'no' to both questions. "I think that nothing about the substantiality or atemporality of correctness follows from the irreducibility of a set of expressions to one another"(???). Rorty points out again that "nonlocal correctness of assertion" requires denial of one or more of I-V, i.e. metaphysical realism.
"Putnam's claim that "reason can't be naturalised" seems to me ambiguous between an uncontroversial but inconsequential truth about irreducibility and a false claim that the Darwinian story leaves a gap in the fabric of causal explanation"(??? - pg 20). Rorty agrees that "reason is both transcendent and immanent" because "all I can mean by 'transcendent' is "pointing beyond our present practices, gesturing in the direction of our possibly different future practices", but Putnam seems to mean more than this ("philosophy, as culture-bound reflection and argument about eternal questions, is both in time and eternity"). Rorty thinks Putnam is "running together our ability to use tensions with our present body of beliefs of desires to put anything (including our present norms and standards for warranted assertibility) up for grabs with our ability to achieve a rightness that is "not just for a time and a place".
Ultimately, Rorty thinks they disagree about "how much can be saved from the realist tradition once we affirm I-V". Putnam thinks there is "room for something like the Apel-Habermas notion of a �universal validity claim�", "nonlocal and nontransient rightness", whereas Rorty wants "to experiment with an image of ourselves (i.e. us wet liberals) as as local and transient as any other species of animals, yet none the worse for that".
To begin with, I�m going to set out a number of premises, of roughly increasingly stringency, so that different theories can be compared in terms of how objective an ethical picture they are painting.
I�m then going to differentiate between the terms �absolute� and �objective�, and argue that rejecting an absolute ethical objectivism still leaves room for a relativistic ethical objectivism.
even relativism could have an objective virtue-theory-like function translating from input circumstances, customs + biology to moral value of act
individualism + rights
if brought up in the right way (i.e. maximally exposed + educated) most people would probably choose some sort of super-Western ideal, which the world is converging upon
structure using arguments from queerness and relativity, and any other anti-realist arguments I can find
the argument from relativity is unimportant, because it scores an epistemological not a metaphysical point � the reason we all disagree need not be at all relevant to whether or not there are objective moral facts, but whether or not we have access to them
perhaps this is a third question that moral realists have to address � given that moral sentences are truth-apt, and that at least some of them are true, can we have access/knowledge of this truth???
feminist critiques of moral objectivism are covered under relativism and biology, as a sort of experiment on disagreement with close-to-home aliens
If I�m successful at that, then next week I�ll look at truth and
On our premium rate channel, we also tease apart long-term confusion about life, the universe and everything.
Perhaps next week I will attempt to
They broadly divide into two camps: the objectivist, realist, cognitivist, naturalist and the non-objectivist, relativist, pluralist, subjectivist, skeptic or anti-realist. The divisions between these are by no means hard and fast.
Words like �objective� and �true� play such a critical role in the debate that I will briefly try and distinguish them from�
Besides this wealth of inter-related theories, there a number of concepts that need to be disambiguated.
In such a situation, the open question argument could even be used as a reductio of the very idea that there are moral features. However,�
I won't go into the details here, but Smith shows that, if sound, the open question argument can equally well dismiss the expressivist just when he was feeling smug at the naturalist�s expense (since it can be used to dismiss any natural feature, including the moral emotions equivalent to �boo� and �hurray� that are a feature of the expressivist agent)
hang on � doesn't it leave non-cognitivism/relativism unharmed though???
Consider a very simple example: if faced with the choice of saving the life of three old, unhappy, lonely people or one young, friendly social worker engaged to be married with a brilliant idea for a cure for cancer (just to labour the point), the (act) utilitarian doctor might, in this rare case, sacrifice three patients for the health of one. From the outside, this choice might be mystifying if all the circumstances relating to the particular application of the rule were not known, and it might seem as though this particular doctor was acting according to quite different rules. This can be easily developed into a relativist argument.
However, this requires one to consider just what sort of circumstances might be so different from one culture to another. Certainly different cultures could be at different stages of the economic development cycle or different climates, and so have different levels of prosperity per capita.
concentrate on growth rather than equality
harsh climate, tougher men, more brutal society
interest-relativity bit of Rorty/Putnam - interestingly, this function could itself be objective.
what is meta-ethics???
can we explain how mere cognitive moral beliefs have motivating force by adding a belief to the effect that �I should act to further my beliefs�???
Nagelian �objective� vs agreed/universal/convergent
thick vs thin
why does he prefer �moral cognitivism� to �moral realism�???
difference between the five different types of relativism???
do non-cognitivists have to argue that our moral statements are not intended to be about the way the world is, or can they just argue that wittingly or unwittingly they aren�t about the way the world is???
expressivism and nihilism both see the world as being value-free and devoid of any moral nature � is this like Mackie�s point, insofar as nihilism is making a first order claim about values, and expressivism is making a second order claim about values
when he says �semantic ascent�, surely he means �semantic assent�???
why can�t the minimalist just stipulate that s must be a declarative sentence (i.e. �I believe that s� must form a meaningful sentence)???
see the argument about Jabberwocky
�the constituent words in the sentence would have to be associated with patterns of usage which make it plain what information about the world people who use the words in those ways intend to convey when they use them� � are we actually able to do this for all of the (especially complicated/abstract) words that we do consider meaningful???
where does this formulation of his, �associated with patterns of usage that make it plain what information about the world people�s use of them is intended to convey�, come from??? is it intended as a general-purpose definition of the �meaning� of a word??? does it work, given that every word (and its associated pattern of usage) is inter-defined with every other word??? plain??? in fact, doesn�t the phrase �information about the world� more or less require (implicitly) a naturalistic explanation of �right� and �wrong�???
isn�t the notion of analyticity extensible to �anything that can be shown to mean the same thing, even after reasoned argument�??? otherwise, practically nothing in the world is analytic, surely???
Smith says that the externalist realist has to explain what it is about the way in which we use moral words that shows their moral/natural feature equivalence to be the right one � doesn�t this assume that we all, at root, use moral words in the same way???
yes, of course it does, that�s what being a moral realist is more or less all about
but is there any way to be a pluralist moral realist??? does that even make sense???
that�s kind of what relativism is, insofar as it�s kind of objective in a limited way, but not absolute
is internal realism saying that �rightness� consists in those acts which elicit desire under certain idealised conditions of reflection??? what about people like Hitler, who spent ages honing Mein Kampf???
he doesn't leave any room for epistemological barriers, i.e. that there may be a right action that we can't decide on, or two equally right actions, does he???
does moral realism leave room for there being some moral sentences which aren't truth-apt??? some acts are morally indifferent, after all
what about degrees of right??? does the rightness apply to all rational beings � what about those who seek death as honour, or something???
�however, it depends on us having a set of desires that is maximally informed, coherent and unified� � what�s he saying here???
Unlike the non-cognitivist, the subjectivist views ethical claims as truth-apt, but as being true in virtue of facts about human desires or inclinations (Routledge) - this seems v close to a form of non-absolute objectivism???
it is more objective than 'i think it is right to help people in distress' (the most extremely subjectivist statement) to say 'it is right for people to help people in distress' - after all, who's to say what's right for a martian with an amplifying empathetic faculty who might distress himself to death by their proximity???
in order for something to be truth-apt (i.e. please a cognitivist), does it have to posit some metaphysical truth???
what's antirealism or skepticism??? nihilism??? where did Nietzsche stand in relation to all of this???
does Nagel think we should bother with 2nd order statements at all???
Pinkers shows that we all make certain kinds of mistakes in our reasoning, e.g. in probability, and indeed have proved many things to be counter-intuitive yet correct � doesn�t this show that our �rational� faculties take shortcuts in lots of situations � how can we havea ny confidence that our reasoning is ever objectively valid???
well, for starters, it�s reasoning that has shown certain counter-intuitive things to be true � that higher form of reasoning is the one philosophers employ
how does Mackie define objective values (�in our sense�) to exclude sheepdog trials???
not in fabric of the world, but only relative to semi-subjective/indeterminate criteria � but what else???
could it be that answering the fundamental question of ethics, �How should one live?�, is best approached in terms of attitudes rather than virtues (which presuppose some sort of metaphysical biology, don�t they???)???
can�t we look to the Kantian/Enlightenment project to access objective values through reason, rather than intuition??? but how, is the question�
Plato�s Euryphro dilemma
when he talks about the mind projecting itself onto the world, e.g. fearfulness, how far can we take this idea that the fearfulness does (to some extent) supervene(???) on natural facts, but is clearly projected too � this seems very very appropriate in comparison to morality�
what�s the difference between colour and right??? what�s all that stuff about secondary qualities and Mackie???
where can I find out more about anti-cognitivist positions, specifically attacking the idea that moral truths can be expressed in language???
finish noting
mackie
note smith in
blackwell
start writing
fill out missing blue bits
fill out relativism + Rorty bits
add in Nietzsche bits
re-read routledge on objectivity
bring in some nagel and read tvfn ch 8
re-read Harman
re-read wiggins
finish noting gowans
re-read mcdowell